Term of Parental Rights as to T.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0115
FILED 02-10-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS21415
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Ed Johnson, PLLC, Peoria
By Edward D. Johnson
Advisory Counsel for Appellant

Law Office of Timothy V. Nelson, Queen Creek
By Timothy V. Nelson
Counsel for Appellee T.C.

Raymya C., Tempe
Appellee
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Veronika Fabian
joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Trent B. (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s order
terminating his parental rights to his child, T.C. (“Child”). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Raymya C. (“Mother”) are the biological parents
of Child, born in October 2015. For Child’s first 19 months, Mother was the
primary caregiver, though Mother and Father lived together and shared
parenting responsibilities. They separated in May 2017. Three weeks later,
Father was arrested for selling marijuana to an undercover police officer.
He was later convicted of selling illegal drugs and sentenced to 11.25 years,
plus five years for violating his probation, to run consecutively.

¶3 Mother obtained an order of protection against Father for
herself and Child stemming from a domestic violence incident before
Father’s arrest. Father had minimal contact with Child for the next five
years.

¶4 In the interim, Mother met and married Stepfather, who took
Child in and treated him as his own son. He took Child to school, enrolled
him in sports and generally offered a positive role model.

¶5 Mother asked Father to voluntarily relinquish his parental
rights so Stepfather could adopt Child in 2022. Father refused and tried to
reinsert himself into their lives. He started writing letters to Child,
arranging video chats and calling Mother to get ahold of Child. After five
years of little contact, Child was uncomfortable with Father’s efforts. That
feeling was exacerbated by Father’s inappropriate questions about Child’s
relationship with Stepfather.

¶6 Father sued for visitation. Father opened a GoFundMe,
which raised $6,000, almost all of which was used on the custody case rather

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than to financially support Child. Mother had the GoFundMe page
removed for using Child’s image without permission.

¶7 Mother petitioned the superior court to terminate Father’s
parental rights in October 2023. She alleged the statutory grounds of
abandonment and length of felony incarceration. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1),
(4). After an evidentiary hearing, the court terminated Father’s rights on
both statutory grounds.

¶8 On abandonment, the superior court reasoned that Father
“has either failed to, or minimally performed, in the myriad of
responsibilities associated with parenting” and only tried to establish a
relationship once Mother sought Father’s consent to adopt. The court also
found Mother’s acts did not rise to the level of interference required to
establish a defense to abandonment.

¶9 On length of felony incarceration, the superior court found
“Father had no relationship with the Child after his arrest until the fifth year
of his incarceration,” and “[a]t this stage of the relationship . . . it will be
very difficult to establish and then maintain the parent/child relationship.”
Although Father argued he sent “volumes” of letters and gifts to Child, the
court found Father not credible. It further found “Father will have been
incarcerated for all but two years” of Child’s adolescence because his
anticipated release date is July 2030 and “[t]here was no testimony to
establish an earlier release date.” Last, the court concluded Mother and
Stepfather provided a stable home environment and Father’s efforts to
interject himself in their family detracted from that environment.

¶10 The superior court found termination was in Child’s best
interests because Stepfather planned to adopt Child, which would provide
permanency and stability. Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction.
Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Even though Mother’s failure to file an answering brief can
constitute waiver, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits because a
child’s best interests are on the line. See Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273,
¶ 10 (App. 2013) (the best interests of a child trump the discretionary
doctrine of waiver).

¶12 Father challenges the superior court’s factual findings on
appeal. To terminate parental rights, the court must find one statutory
ground for termination under § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence,

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and that termination is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of
the evidence. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149–50, ¶ 8
(2018). We will affirm a severance order unless clearly erroneous and
accept the superior court’s findings of fact unless unsupported by
reasonable evidence. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280,
¶ 4 (App. 2002).

I. Length of Felony Incarceration.

¶13 Section 8-533(B)(4) provides for termination of the parent-
child relationship if “the parent is deprived of civil liberties due to the
conviction of a felony if . . . the sentence of that parent is of such length that
the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years.” There
is no “bright line” definition of when a sentence is long enough to deprive
a child of a normal home for a period of years; the inquiry is individualized
and fact specific. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 9
(2021). The relevant factors include:

(1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship
existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which
the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured
during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the
relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that
incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the
length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to
provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the
deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.

Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251–52, ¶ 29 (2000). A
lack of evidence on one or more of the Michael J. factors may not require
reversal. Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 450, ¶ 15 (App.
2007).

¶14 The superior court assessed each of the Michael J. factors and
its findings were supported by reasonable evidence.

¶15 Pre-incarceration relationship. The first factor is “the length
and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration
begins.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251–52, ¶ 29. The superior court found the
relationship between Father and Child was minimal when incarceration
began. The record shows that Mother was the primary caregiver during
Child’s first 19 months, though Father and Mother shared parenting
responsibilities. Child did not remember Father when Father tried to
reconnect. On balance, this factor favors neither party.

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¶16 Relationship during incarceration. The second factor is “the
degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and
nurtured during the incarceration.” Id. at 252, ¶ 29. The superior court
found it was doubtful that Father could reestablish and foster a relationship
with Child. After he was sent to prison, Father had minimal contact with
Child for five years and their relationship was nonexistent. Father’s recent
efforts to reestablish that relationship have been unfruitful because his calls
have made Child uncomfortable. This factor favors termination.

¶17 Age of children and deprivation of a normal home. The third
factor is “the age of the child and the relationship between the child’s age
and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal
home.” Id. The superior court found Child, now nine years old, would be
deprived of a normal home because Father will be incarcerated for all but
two years of Child’s remaining childhood. This factor favors termination.

¶18 Length of absence. The fourth factor is the length of the
sentence. Id. The record supports the finding that Father’s earliest release
date is July 18, 2030. No evidence was introduced to show an earlier release
date, and he has exhausted his judicial remedies. See Ariz. Dep’t of Econ Sec.
v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437, 441, ¶ 16 (App. 2014) (finding that anticipated
release date is a relevant factor). What is more, his release date doesn’t
account for conditions of release that may affect his ability to interact with
Child, like completing community supervision. See Jeffrey P. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 214, ¶ 10 (App. 2016). This factor favors termination.

¶19 Available parent. The fifth factor is “the availability of
another parent to provide a normal home life.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 252,
¶ 29. The superior court found that Mother could serve that role, and the
record shows she provided a stable home environment for Child during
Father’s incarceration. When another parent is available to provide a stable
home, the court should also consider whether the incarcerated parent
detracts from that stable environment. Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
252 Ariz. 470, 477, ¶ 27 (2022). The court found Father’s actions have
undermined the stable home supplied by Mother. Father used his calls to
pressure Child and criticize Stepfather. And Child did not benefit from
Father’s use of Child’s image to fundraise for litigation. This factor favors
termination.

¶20 Effect of deprivation. The sixth factor is “the effect of the
deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.” Michael J., 196
Ariz. at 252, ¶ 29. The superior court found Child had been deprived of the

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normal love and care of a father in the home. But that harm had been
mitigated by Stepfather’s presence. This factor favors termination.

¶21 The superior court did not abuse its discretion because
reasonable evidence supported its decision. Because we affirm on length of
felony incarceration, we need not reach the alternative ground for
termination. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3 (court may affirm if
reasonable evidence supports at least one termination ground).

II. Best Interests.

¶22 Termination is in a child’s best interests if that child “would
derive an affirmative benefit from termination or incur a detriment by
continuing in the relationship.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz.
332, 334, ¶ 6 (App. 2004). A child’s prospective adoption is evidence of a
benefit to support a best-interests finding. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239
Ariz. 1, 3–5, ¶¶ 12, 17 (2016).

¶23 The superior court found termination was in Child’s best
interests because Stepfather wants to adopt him. Both Stepfather and Child
want to proceed with the adoption, and it would result in permanency and
stability for Child. We discern no abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶24 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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